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Introduction

The production, consumption, and regulation of tobacco is presently the subject of much
discussion and debate. While the issues surrounding tobacco have been debated for
decades, much of the current attention on tobacco is due to the many proposals to
regulate tobacco, the state and class action lawsuits pending against the tobacco industry,
and the damaging tobacco company documents that have recently been made public. Most
tobacco control proposals are intent on expanding the presence of government in the
tobacco industry through increased regulation and taxation. A majority of the controversy

s
a

over tobacco regulation focuses on the role of government in a capitalistic market. How

~

much regulation is allowed by law, or required by morality; How much regulation is too

!

much? Or when it comes to a product proven to cause death, such as tobacco, is it ethical

~
EJ

to allow it on the market virtually unregulated, as it has been for decades? Where do we

:J

draw the line between fostering capitalism and promoting public health when the interests

~

conflict with one another?

After tracing the history of governmental regulation of tobacco and the concurrent antitobacco movement, this thesis will emphasize the most significant aspects of the current
proposals to increase the governmental regulation of tobacco products. As history and the
facts present themselves, it becomes clear that the opposing sides in this controversy do
not possess equally compelling arguments. However, the debate is not simply two-sided;
there are many issues at hand, each of which intertwine with one's own subjective reality.

CHAPTER!
THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING TOBACCO REGULATION

Tobacco is a purely American product in its origin, development, and domination ofthe
world market. The history of tobacco in America is literally as old as America itself In
comparison, the history of the governmental regulation of tobacco is relatively short. The
federal government is now considering seriously regulating the tobacco industry for the
first time. 1998 could be remembered as the historic year that tobacco and nicotine fell
under federal jurisdiction.

~
While the tobacco companies are not responsible for inventing smoking, they do depend
on this dangerous behavior for their existence. The tobacco industry encourages people to
risk their lives, for the sole objective of making their industry profitable. Tobacco
company executives and stockholders have grown rich relying on the consumption of their
deadly products by the 47.6 million people who currently smoke. 1
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Tobacco regulation represents a moral dilemma that pits aggressive capitalism against the
common welfare, often ranks money over public health, and emphasizes the need for
prioritization of governmental responsibilities. Which is more important: promoting health
or capitalism? In this case, are they mutually exclusive or is there room for compromise?

1

American Heart Association. Heart and Stroke Fact Sheet. Statistical Suwlement. (1996).

3

While the growing and selling of tobacco obviously benefits certain people financially, it
physically hanns more people than it helps. All industries in a capitalistic market are forced
to focus on their bottom line. However, for the tobacco industry, the bottom line is the
direct result of producing the only product that when used as intended, has been proven to
kill the consumer. Even though it is legal for the tobacco industry to profit from selling
this legal product, an outstanding moral question remains; Is it ethical to profit from
someone's death? By observing the tobacco industry's priorities, as well as the
government's, a conclusion can be drawn that policies benefiting one industry's business

3

goals often prevail over ones benefiting the common welfare. In this nation that prides

~

itself in fostering individualism, competivism, and egotism, (self-interested, selfpreservationist), the assumption that these types of policies are wrong, and they should be
the reverse, is very controversial.
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Tobacco remains legal because its use was widely diffused and smoking became an
acceptable adult choice of behavior before the hazards of tobacco were well understood.
While the controversy over the governmental regulation of tobacco seems to have only
two sides, it includes many different issues, all of which revolve around the main question
of the role of government in regulating industry, advancing public health, and promoting
capitalism. Should those roles be active (regulatory) or passive (laissez-faire)?

A total prohibition on tobacco, while now scientifically justifiable, is politically

3
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implausible, for a number of reasons, including the large number of current smokers, and
the inevitable rise of an underground market. A legal, regulated market is much safer for
consumers because it is easier to control access to and the content of tobacco products.

Some regard the regulation of smoking as an invasion of privacy by a paternalistic big
brother. In this case, it is argued that the government is trying to make its citizens' choices
for them; 'they think they know what's better for me than I do.' This paternalism argument
assumes that the government is set out to protect smokers from themselves, but neglects

3

to include the fact that the government is set out to protect others from tobacco smoke.

a

The discovery of the dangers ofEnvironmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) changed the
smoking issue into a public matter by including protection for nonsmokers. 2 Describing the
tobacco regulation issue to be one of personal freedom (to have a pleasurable vice) versus -

nJ
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the crazed preoccupation of health fanatics, some position tobacco regulation as a state's
intrusion on the rights of citizens to perform a legal act and pose smoking as a civil and
human right that anti-smoking advocates are out to abolish. However, such a civil right
does not exist. There does exist a right to life, to breathe clean air. Thus, smoking
regulation is not discrimination, as cigarette or pipe smoking is not an innate trait such as
gender or race. It is a behavior that can be modified. The unfortunate reality is that most

2

Even those who present the issue as a purely private matter are presuming that one's life choices do not affect
others. Smoking causes much suffering from disease, which results in many family members and friends hurt
by the individual's 'choice'. Smoking places an unfair emotional and financial burden on those who chose not to
smoke.

3
~
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smokers would eventually like to quit, but that 'choice' is denied them by the addictive
qualities of tobacco products.

Freedom to do as one chooses, so long as others are not adversely affected, is the essence
of each American's birthright. By some, smoking regulation is seen as an abridgment of
this freedom. However, nonsmokers are affected by other people's smoke, whether or not
they impose their preference on those who choose to smoke. Public health groups do not
challenge the right of an adult to choose to smoke; it is where they can smoke that is the

3

issue. Even though the nonsmokers are a majority, for the most part, they allow

~

individuals the freedom to behave differently and tolerate those differences. This tolerance
is an American virtue that smokers rely on. In a society where the majority rules, smokers,
like other minorities, depend on the American values of individualism and freedom of

nJ
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choice.

b

3

3
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Still others position the argument against tobacco regulation around social class. The
prevalence of cigarette smoking is inversely related to social class. Statistically,
nonsmokers are better educated, and generally hold a higher position in society. This
argument declares that nonsmokers abuse this higher social class to impose unnecessary
restrictions on the lower ranks of society as a simple sign of power. These people regard
smoking regulation as discrimination against the lower class when in all actuality the
restrictions are meant to save their lower-class lives .

...___

~
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The slippery-slope defense against governmental regulation of tobacco argues that once
government starts regulating unhealthy behavior, it will never stop. This argument is
countered by the fact that tobacco represents a different circumstance because there is no
known safe dosage of tobacco. Moderation will prevent other 'health sins', such as alcohol
and fatty food, from causing death. The addictive nature of nicotine compounds the health
problem associated with tobacco because other dangerous vices are not addictive. This
addiction makes it difficult, although not impossible, to quit harming oneself

3
For obvious reasons, the tobacco industry supports this individual freedom of choice
campaign. At the expense of their consumers' health, they champion their cause as a
consumers rights issue, while their only concern is maintaining their profits. Tobacco
companies say that smokers are informed and, need to be, in order to make this rational

~
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choice, but the companies are not the ones doing the informing. That burden is left to
governments and health advocates. Nonetheless, the companies make use of public
awareness as a defense. While public awareness is an important first step in any newly
found danger to health, it holds especially true for the tobacco and health problem because
the companies cloud the issue by denying the scientific studies.

Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop stressed the urgent need for "an informed
public that understands the political, social, and economic dimensions of this 20th century

•.....__
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plague." 3 Between 1981-89, he submitted a total of eight reports on smoking and health
to Congress during his tenure as Surgeon General. His position mirrors that of most public
health officials~ the government does have some responsibility to ensure that those making
the decision to smoke have the relevant facts needed to make an informed decision.

There are a few academics willing to exonerate tobacco and tobacco manufacturers. In
Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment, Robert Tollison wants to
prove that cigarettes do not cause cancer and that the real threat from tobacco arises from
those who would like to restrict it one way or another. His libertarian argument is that
overzealous crusaders endanger a free society. However tempting his argument may be, it
is difficult to discredit the mountains of scientific studies establishing tobacco as the cause
of heart disease and many cancers.
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Regardless of the multitude of arguments against it, tobacco regulation remains
constitutional. There is no stated right to smoke in the Constitution, as there is to bear
arms. 4 Tobacco regulation does not infringe on the First Amendment~ it does not impair
freedom of speech, assembly, or association as protected by the First Amendment. In
searching for a solution to the controversy over governmental regulation of tobacco, there

3

C. Everett Koop. In foreword of Merchants of Death. (N.Y. : BeechTree Books, 1988).
The tobacco industry is sometimes compared to the gun industry because both products cause death, but
the gun industry defense (there is 'right to bear arms' clause) cannot be used for tobacco.
4
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must be some limits on the tobacco industry's freedom to deceive and harm its consumers.
Citizens rely on their government to regulate industry. Tobacco is the perfect case for
governmental intervention because even though it is highly addictive and deadly, it is
consistently promoted as pleasurable. This paper discusses why the government's response
to the tobacco health crisis has been so slow and how and why the recently proposed
regulations are meant to increase its pace.
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Chapter 2
THE TOBACCO CONTROL MOVEMENT:
The Birth of Tobacco Control
In the 1940s, the real health peril presented by tobacco use seemed trivial. Little hard
evidence of the danger of tobacco use existed prior to the early 1950s, although
preliminary studies began confirming the dangers as early as 1939.1

By 1950, 50% ofthe adult population smoked.2 Government hospitals even distributed
cigarettes free to patients. Lung cancer went from a rare disorder to a raging epidemic
3

between 1950 and 1970, from 18,000 cases to 110,000. The Department of Agriculture's
tobacco division promoted the sales ofU.S. tobacco abroad by distributing an expensive
sales promotion film that stressed the virtues of cigarette smoking. It was available to all
nations interested in Importing U.S. tobacco products.

3
~
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Throughout the 1950s, as studies multiplied on the manner and immensity of disease
caused from smoking cigarettes, the role of government as guardian of public health was
questioned. Today, it still remains a matter of public concern. Long after the scientific
studies agreed on the issue, public debate still rages over the government's role and

1

A. Lee Fritschler. Smoking and Politics. Policymakers and the Federal Bureaucracy. (Prentice-Hall, Inc:
New Jersey, 1975) p.157.
2
Philip J. Hilts. Smokescreen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industzy Cover-up. (Reading, MA: AddisonWesley Publishing Co., 1996) p.l .
3
Hilts. p.3.
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responsibilities. In principle, governments have a responsibility in the interests of public
health. As chief defender of public health, governments ought to be the tobacco industry's
adversary, but in practice government officials often act as its ally. 4 The government's slow
response to the mounting smoking studies of the 1950s was two-fold. Both the strength of
the tobacco industry and the relative weakness of the public health interest groups
contributed to the success of tobacco's influence on the early legislation regulating
tobacco.

3
A consensus about the dangers of smoking began to emerge in the medical and public
health community in 1957, when The National Cancer Institute, the National Heart
Institute, the American Cancer Society, and the American Heart Association sponsored a
report declaring cigarette smoking a causative factor in lung cancer. The report prompted
Surgeon General LeRoy Burney to take the first official governmental position on the
smoking and health issue: "The weight of the evidence is increasingly pointing in one

~
~

~
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direction that excessive smoking is one of the causative factors in lung cancer." s Although
mild, the statement marked the start of the government's concern with the issue.

4

As an example, consider the $50 billion tax break for the industry that was slipped into the budget at
the last minute. The settlement hasn't even been passed and legislators are finding loopholes in it. It is
important to note, however, that when tobacco deals receive wide public exposure, political officials tend to
disassociate themselves with tobacco and the deals are withdrawn. It seems the only way to keep tobacco
deals from occurring is constant media exposure, which even the hardline anti-smoking advocates get sick of
seeing.
s Richard Kluger. Ashes To Ashes. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1996) p.20 1.
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At this early stage in the anti-tobacco campaign, the American Cancer Society, (ACS),
emerged as the sole voice speaking out against the dangers of tobacco. The leaders of
ACS were first became involved in the issue by urging doctors to take a more active role
in discouraging their patients from smoking and started producing pamphlets and
filmstrips for distribution in schools in hopes of smoking prevention through education.
"We are all looking for a breakthrough in cancer," said Howard Taylor, Jr., a Columbia
professor of obstetrics and gynecology, "We already have it-- through prevention we can
control most of the lung cancer problem. "6

3
!>

The first governmental actions concerning smoking and health came in 1957 with
committee hearings on the Federal Trade Commission's oversight of cigarette advertising.
The hearings conducted by John A. Blatnik (D-Minn.), chairman ofthe Legafand •

i1
~
~
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Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee, sought to
redefine the responsibility of the FTC so it could enforce standards of truthfulness in
advertising claims relating to the effectiveness of cigarette filters. The subcommittee's
report sharply criticized the advertising practices of cigarette manufacturers despite
Blatnik's admitted enjoyment of smoking: "The cigarette manufacturers have deceived the
7

American public through their advertising of cigarettes. " As punishment for its negative

6

Institute of Medicine. Growjng up Tobacco-Free: Preventing Nicotine Addiction in Children and
Youth.(Washington, D .C. : National Academy Press, 1994).
7

Fritschler. p.27.
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findings, Blatnik's subcommittee was dissolved. 8 It seems harsh that a committee could be
abolished after a report finding; after all, why have research or reports if only one answer
is acceptable?

In this troubling era of American history, which included domestic unrest, the civil rights
movement, and the Vietnam War, the public conscience was consumed with other
important issues. There was no distinct public health 'lobby', as cigarette smoking was not
one of the 'hot' issues of the day. The Interagency Council on Smoking and Health, an

3

organization formed in 1964 was the only national organization urging action on the issue.

~

It consisted of both public and ·p rivate organizations concerned with public health,
including the ACS, ALA, and AHA, occupational and industrial groups, and government
9

agencies. This group, although quite large, had very little political muscle. Even though

ll
~
~
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I

their members may have agreed on the mission of tobacco regulation, they were not
coordinated on one single public policy priority. They had neither the money, nor the

::Tl

~

~
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power to challenge the well-organized tobacco interests. The only national organization
effectively involved in combating the smoking problem, the American Cancer Society,
declined to invest its high standing in the Interagency Council. It was not prepared to
subordinate its leadership role. ACS director, Irving Rimer noted, "Nobody wanted to

8

Ibid., in footnote, she explains it was not the first and only time a subcommittee was punished for its
reports. This was also mentioned in a variety of other sources.(K.luger.p.l 89).
9

Kluger. p.285.

-ll·

13

cede the Interagency Council any power.. .It didn't do anything except publish a
newsletter. "10 This unwillingness to effectively unite forces and coordinate the movement
is a common theme, which is present throughout the history of the tobacco control
movement and is responsible for much of the movement's weakness.

Throughout the '60s and '70s, the drive to regulate cigarettes came not from Congress,
which tobacco had well under control, but from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
which is responsible for controlling unfair and deceptive practices in business. 1964
marked the official start of governmental regulation of tobacco when on January 11th, in a
momentous news conference, Surgeon General Luther Terry issued the first highly
advertised governmental report linking smoking to lung cancer. It was titled Smoking and

Health: A Report to the Surgeon General because an advisory committee produced it
after being appointed by the Surgeon General to investigate whether or not smoking
causes cancer. The report was actually a review and summary of accumulated evidence
that established the link between smoking and lung cancer from studies published in the
early 1950s. At first considered a political success because it caused other agencies to take
a closer look at tobacco, the highly publicized report failed to bring about any immediate
or substantial remedies to the tobacco and health problem. It did create the beginning of
the government's role in the anti-smoking movement and prompted many subsequent

10

Ibid.
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studies and reports on the health hazards of tobacco.

The Surgeon General's report resulted in immediate questions concerning the
government's responsibility in requiring cigarette manufacturers to inform consumers of
the results of studies of the medical and scientific communities. A swift answer to that
question came as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that it would issue
rules governing the advertising and labeling of cigarettes. Within one week after the report
was issued, the FTC prepared a regulation requiring a health warning to appear in

3

cigarette advertising and on cigarette packages.

~

a
As a defense strategy, the tobacco industry accused the FTC of acting unconstitutionally.
By questioning the FTC's authority to make policy involving a cigarette health warning,

~

~
:1

the industry stalled the implementation of the new rules, thereby insuring that federal court
or Congress, but not the FTC, would make the final policy decision. The Congressional
debate was centered in the Senate Commerce Committee, which exercised responsibility
over the FTC. Earle Clements, the tobacco industry's chief lobbyist, persuaded the others
in the industry that what they really wanted was a congressional bill that had at least the
appearance of a health regulation, yet effectively dismantled the FTC's pending version
and prevented, through the preemptive power of federal legislation, a multiplicity of

L _
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warning labels by state and local governments.

11

Congress was not receptive to the FTC's proposals for cigarette health warnings. Those
profiting from tobacco advertising dollars were worried that the regulations might create a
loss in revenue. The threat to advertisers encouraged others, such as the American
Newspaper Association and he Advertising Federation of America, to join the tobacco
people in opposition to the FTC's proposals. In 1965, the industry created the Cigarette
Advertising and Promotion Code, a self-policing organization meant to avoid more serious

5

governmental regulation. They agreed to change the tone of cigarette advertising by not

~

advertising health claims relating to tar and nicotine yields. This was intended as a sign to
Congress and the public that the industry was interested in regulating itself, and that the .
action of the FTC was an unnecessary obstacle to self-regulation. The two major goals of
this voluntary code were to prohibit advertising to persons under 21 and to prohibit health
claims in cigarette advertising. The code's stated purpose was to blunt the charge that the
industry was massively seducing minors. When considering how serious the industry took
this code, it should be noted that these efforts were confined to domestic business
practices only and not applied in foreign markets.

Following the announcement of this code, Congress passed The Cigarette and Labeling

11

Kluger. p.279.
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Act in 1965, which transformed the voluntary restrictions into law, at the same time
removing some of the power of the FTC. This act was actually a victory for the tobacco
industry and did little to promote public health. Members of Congress wrote and
promoted it in terms of protecting public health, but instead it effectively eliminated the
power of the FTC in the cigarette advertising field and preempted state and local
governments from passing stricter labeling laws. It passed with no opposition from the
cigarette manufacturers, since their voluntary code already covered their legal
requirements. The health warning label was to be required only on cigarette packages,

5

becoming effective in 1966.

~

a
The passage of this act was a major victory for cigarette manufacturers and their allies.
The tobacco industry needed some legislation from Congress, or the much more severe
FTC rule would stand. The new law covered only half of the FTC's proposals. Eight years
after that first Surgeon General's report on tobacco and the FTC announced its proposal,
the whole policy was eventually adopted.

12

The tobacco state legislators had powerful reasons to side with tobacco interests, namely
their constituents' support. On the other hand, there were very few 'health' legislators.

12

The requirement for inclusion of the health warnings in all print ads became effective in 1972 due to
another voluntary 'compromise' by the cigarette manufacturers.

~
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Those members who did champion the health cause had no substantial constituent interest
to back them up. Because the anti-smoking forces were not nearly as well-organized or as
well-funded as the cigarette interests, the first few successful tobacco control measures
were a direct result of the efforts of specific individuals, such as John Banzhaf, Til.
Banzhaf was an early pioneer in the legal battles for nonsmoker's rights. He founded the
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), financed entirely by volunteer contributions, to
fight for federal tobacco regulation. In 1969, he persuaded the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to apply the Fairness Doctrine to cigarette commercials. This proved

3

to be one of the most significant events in the tobacco regulation controversy. The

~

Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to allot free time for opposing views on matters
of public controversy dealt with on the air.

~
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Congressional hearings in 1969 resulted in a total broadcast ban oftobacco advertising on
radio and TV. The industry agreed to cease the ads in 1970, but Congress gave them an
extension and made it effective in 1971. The cigarette manufacturers voluntarily agreed to
the ban in order to prevent the airing of the effective anti-smoking advertisements. The
ACS produced the majority of these advertisements that contributed to the general decline
in smoking rates.

13

13

Banzhaf, through ASH, was instrumental in the both the

An argument can be made that these ads did not 'cause' smoking rates to decline; other factors must be
considered.
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implementation and compliance of the FCC's ruling, by raising a legal defense fund to help
protect and defend it.

~
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Discovering Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS)

Even though the first study of "public exposure to air pollution from tobacco smoke"
came in the 1972 Surgeon General's Report, this threat to the tobacco industry did not
officially begin until the dangers of exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS)
were revealed in 1986 with the Surgeon General's Report, The Health Consequences of

Involuntary Smoking. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop announced that "widespread
exposure to ETS in the United States presents a serious and substantial public health
impact. "14 This report concluded that passive smoking caused lung cancer in nonsmokers.

i
~
~

ETS, sometimes called secondhand smoke, is the air pollution that results from the
smoking of cigarettes. 'Passive• smoking is the involuntary inhaling of tobacco smoke by
nonsmokers in a smoke-filled atmosphere. These nonsmokers inhale sidestream smoke--

~
~
:r
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smoke that is not drawn through the cigarette- and mainstream smoke-- smoke that is
exhaled by the smoker. Sidestream smoke contains much higher percentages of tar,
nicotine, and noxious gases than the smoke inhaled by a smoker. More than 4,000
chemicals, including at least 40 carcinogens, are contained in ETS. It can take as long as
two days to eliminate nicotine from the body of a

14

smoker~

the process is even slower for

Surgeon General. "The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking. " (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Public Health Services, Centers for Disease Control, Center for Chronic Disease Prevention
and Health Promotion, Office of Smoking and Health. Washington D.C., 1986).
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individuals who breathe sidestream smoke.

15

ETS can result in aggravated asthmatic conditions, impaired blood circulation, bronchitis,
and pneumonia. In addition, it poses additional health hazards for unborn and young
children. Children exposed to secondhand smoke have increased risks of respiratory
illnesses and infections, impaired development oflung function, and middle ear infections.
Infants born to women who smoked during pregnancy are more likely to die of Sudden
Infant Death syndrome (SIDS). Pregnant smokers experience more stillbirths, spontaneous

~

abortions, premature births and low weight babies than nonsmoking mothers. Children

)

born to mothers who smoked during pregnancy may have measurable deficiencies in
physical growth, learning disabilities, birth defects, and chronic breathing difficulties.

~

~
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In comparison, inhaled tobacco smoke does more damage to the smoker than secondhand
smoke does to the nonsmoker; however, the active smoker accepts that damage
voluntarily. Even though active cigarette smoking causes much more death and disease
than involuntary smoking, ETS is still responsible for more than 53,000 deaths each year
in the United States. That may be a relatively small number in comparison to the 434,000
Americans that die annually from active smoking, but by no means is it an insignificant

15

Surgeon General. "Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoldng: 25 years of Progress." (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Washington D.C., 1989).

21

amount of suffering.

16

As evidence ofthe dangers ofETS accumulated during the 1970s, a grassroots movement
at the local level for nonsmokers rights emerged. But these opponents of tobacco could
not match the tobacco companies in either wealth or political influence. To the industry,
these groups were mainly an irritant, not feared enemies. While the public increasingly
accepted the scientific consensus about tobacco use, the tobacco industry pooled its
resources to fight any initiative intended to further the cause of public health groups. In
both the social and political arenas, the cigarette makers were triumphant largely because
they faced no organized opposition. The voices of protest were weak and scattered. A
1978 report by a national commission on tobacco and health policy called the antismoking effort, "minimal and symbolic" and noted that in relation to the size and scope of

J
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the problem, only a very small amount of the $230 million raised annually by the three
largest health voluntaries had gone to combat smoking.

17

The disorganized array of health

groups had neither the leadership nor financial means to coalesce into an effective lobbying
organization. They were overwhelmed by the giant tobacco industry and its supporters
from the early 1950s onward.

16

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "Cigarette Smoking- Attributable Potential Life Lost."
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. (1991 ).pp.62-71.
17 Kluger. p.465.
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From the previous experience of the Sixties, the anti-smoking advocates learned not to
wait for conclusive evidence before pursuing policies to prevent passive smoking from
causing cancer in nonsmokers. Although the scientific evidence was relatively new
regarding the magnitude of the health hazard from ETS, that did not stop the
environmentally concerned anti-smoking advocates from going full-steam ahead with the
issue. By framing the issue as a right of nonsmokers to breathe clean air, they shifted the
tobacco regulation argument from a personal to a public matter. ETS gave the antismoking advocates more justification for governmental intervention and regulation
because there was no 'individual choice' involved in the danger to nonsmokers. ETS has
even become a factor in custody cases. Courts have ruled that nonsmoking parents
provide a more suitable environment for children.

)
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The anti-smoking groups initially focused their efforts on smoking in public places. The
rationale behind this movement is that nonsmokers need to use public facilities and should
not be exposed to a health risk while doing so. A significant side-effect of the no-smoking
policies is the denormalization of tobacco use in American life. This promotes public
health in two ways. First, smokers may smoke less often when smoking is restricted in
certain places. Second, nonsmoking becomes the social norm, thus discouraging youths
from beginning to smoke. Prohibiting tobacco use in public places, including the
workplace, has proven to be an effective way of establishing a tobacco-free norm,
eliminating ETS and decreasing overall tobacco consumption.
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The other area of focus for anti-smoking groups is the workplace. The workplace is
targeted because adults spend a significant portion of their waking hours at work. Daily
exposure to tobacco smoke poses an unnecessary health risk, and therefore, elimination of
tobacco smoke exposure leads to decreased employee health problems, increased
productivity, and a safer work environment. As ETS remains on surface of the
governmental regulation of tobacco controversy, a question arises about legal liability for
permitting smoking in business buildings, such as private offices, restaurants and bars.
ETS exposure is three to five times higher in restaurants than typical workplace
exposure. 18 Workers' Compensation has enabled both smokers and nonsmokers to recover
damages encountered by employers' failure to regulate smoking in the workplace. 19

)

J

The fundamental issue involved in regulating tobacco use shifts with the discovery of the
l·i

dangers ofETS. No longer is it an issue of paternalism, or excessive governmental
regulation versus individual freedom . Nonsmokers need protection from ETS because they
chose not to smoke, but still encounter the risks associated with smoking. Clean Indoor
Air Laws are ideal for dealing with this problem because they do not prohibit smokers
from endangering themselves, but rather prohibit them from endangering others.
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The groups that initiated the attack on tobacco were relatively small grassroots
organizations. Their campaigns lacked sufficient funds and were forced to rely entirely on
the dedication of their volunteers. In California, the Group Against Smoking Pollution
(GASP) pressed for local anti-smoking measures and tried to educate the public about the
hazards of smoking and ETS. The public policy mission of the nonsmokers rights groups
was to protect nonsmokers from the effects of tobacco smoke by restricting smoking in
public places. There was initially wide public support for the anti-smoking initiatives,
called Prop 5 and 10, until the tobacco industry spent millions to establish campaigns
against the initiatives through front organizations, such as Californians for Common Sense
and Californians Against Reguiatory Excess (CARE). These organizations were funded
solely by the tobacco companies in relation to their market share. Tobacco companies hid
their connections to these campaigns. They maintained separate identities and disguised
their direct affiliation with the tobacco industry. These groups were responsible for
defeating the tobacco control initiatives. While these anti-smoking groups were not
concerned with the economic impact of the smoking restrictiqns, the tobacco industry
realized the potential loss of profit and spent $6 million to defeat Prop 5 in 1978, more
than twenty times what the GASP-led clean air coalition spent. 20 The initiative lost by 8%
and the 1980 Prop 10 lost by 6%.21 In 1981, the coalition reorganized as Californians for

20
21

l
.a....

Kluger. p.477.

Ibid.

J'
lll

i~

J
J}

,,j)
l

-

25

Nonsmokers Rights (CNR).

It was not until 1983, in San Francisco, that the first truly restrictive rules against smoking
in the workplace passed in a major metropolitan area. The measure, called PropP, was
designed to accommodate the wishes of both smokers and nonsmokers by calling for
separate work areas for each. CNR regarded work places as more important than public
places because of the length of exposure and voluntary nature of going to public places as
compared to going to work. Once again the industry's front group, this time, San
Franciscans Against Government Intrusion, argued that the measure would drive people
apart. The industry barely missed buying another victory, as the law was upheld. The
greater meaning in this non-smoking victory was that the tobacco companies could be
beaten at the local level, where nonsmokers can rally together and pass legislation where
r

the industry has less of an influence.
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Five years later, in 1988, Prop 99 passed, raising the tax on cigarettes to highest level
ever. It was used to educate citizens about the hazards of smoking and to help smokers
quit. Tobacco spent more than I million to try to counter that campaign, but lost. 22 Other
Californian cities followed San Francisco's lead, but California was not the only
battleground for the tobacco companies. In Dade County, Florida, the tobacco industry
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established another committee with a name to hide the industry's involvement, Floridians
Against Increased Regulation, which helped defeat another local anti-smoking effort. Most
states have had at least one bout over local tobacco regulation.

The tobacco industry had access to levels of power in Congress, but the health
organizations had none. Access is important because if a smoking control bill was filed by
somebody without senior standing on a key committee, it would not go far. Because the
tobacco interests exerted considerable influence within the traditional legislative system
through members of Congress serving on committees or subcommittees immediately
involved in tobacco politics, there was little hope for the successful initiation of new policy
within Congress. Health and consumer advocates had to use other avenues. They
depended heavily on the power of administrative agencies, such as the FTC and the FCC,
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and later the FDA, to make public policy in order to break the deadlock of the status quo
maintained by the tobacco legislators.
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When the national smoking control movement started materializing, it was not through
these small and scattered, financially unstable grassroot campaigns, but through the three
big voluntary health organizations, of which the American Cancer Society (ACS) was the
largest and best financed. The ACS, along with the American Heart Association (AHA)
and the American Lung Association (ALA), had size, organization, and a universally
acknowledged mission to educate the public. What they lacked was political experience.
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Since they rely on volunteer contributions, they must maintain a conservative approach to
politics. In the beginning, they were cautious because their tax-exempt status could have
been threatened if they lobbied extensively. When in 1976, federal lobbying laws changed
to allow tax-exempt organizations to maintain adjunct arms for lobbying, the health
voluntaries still were not that willing to merge their separate identities for the anti-tobacco
cause.

Charles Le Maistre, a member of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking
and Health, finally brought the anti-smoking advocates together on a national level at the
1981 National Conference on Smoking or Health, which drew representatives from 21
nationwide public health organizations and several hundred of the most knowledgeable
and committed profe-ssionals in the anti-smoking field. He convinced the then ACS
president, Lane Adams, that the smoking control movement would get nowhere unless it
was lead by the public health community. The conference resulted in the formation of the
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Coalition on Smoking or Health, with the purpose of advancing federal tobacco regulation
through legislation. Their task was to create political movement so that their agenda
would finally get a serious hearing in Congress. There had never been a single piece of
anti-smoking legislation passed that the industry did not in some way support. Within the
first year of operation, one of the Coalition's priorities -an increase in the excise taxactually passed. But once again, the companies used the legislation to their advantage by
using the tax increase to cover up a price increase of their own resulting in even higher
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profits.

Practically speaking, there was no coordinated national smoking-control movement. The
organizations had their own agendas, member lists, and newsletters. The organizations
involved in the Coalition on Smoking or Health worried about losing their separate
identities. ANR was growing but lacked funding and a presence in Washington. AMA was
not actively lobbying. One of the difficulties that plagued the health groups was the
absence of agreement on just what they wanted Congress to do. They agreed only that
cigarette smoking was harmful to health and that government should do something about
it.

The anti-smoking movement has grown a great deal since the Sixties. It expanded in 1984,
when Californians for Nonsmokers Rights, (CNR) extended its mission and changed its
name to Americans for Nonsmokers Rights, (ANR). At the national level, the Advocacy

0

0
Institute's Smoking Control Advocacy Resource Center (SCARC) plays a unique
supporting role by bringing together diverse segments of the tobacco control movement.
Its electronic communications network, SCARCNet, provides tobacco control advocates
with timely, concise strategic resources and offers them the opportunity to discuss
strategic questions and share advocacy successes and failures. The Advocacy Institute was
created from foundation grants and private gifts for public interest causes, primarily antitobacco, trying to prompt action from federal lawmakers and regulators. This type of

29

supporting organization is not a "frontline" organization, instead these organizations
support the efforts and coordinate advocacy groups. Currently, there are various other
groups, across the nation, dedicated to the tobacco control movement.

The one powerful group that might have been expected to counter the tobacco industry
earlier was the American Medical Association. The AMA, with its large number of
physicians, was slow to join the anti-smoking campaign. Many felt that the AMA and its
medical journals were downplaying the smoking issue due to a need for allies to face the
rising tide of national sentiment favoring publicly financed health care for citizens over
65. 23 The AMA was opposed to Medicare and needed the votes of Senators from the
tobacco states. They did not participate in the 1984 congressional hearings on the
cigarette labeling bill, but did finally come around to protest tobacco at committee
hearings. AMA doctors gave testimony in 1985 favoring making the federal cigarette sales
tax permanent. And in 1985, the AMA supported the complete ban on the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes when Mike Synar (D-Mass.) proposed a bill to eliminate all
tobacco advertising and promotion. Mike Synar is known for promoting legislation calling
for the banning of tobacco advertising or limiting it to tombstone advertising. The bills
have never made it through the legislative process.
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Tobacco interests never lost a single legislative battle in Congress until 1983 when
Congressman Heruy Waxman (D-CA), chairman of the subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, emerged as a forceful anti-tobacco politician by introducing the Smoking
Prevention Act. He held hearings that focused on nicotine addiction and gave antismoking forces maximum exposure, stating that, "In a society where instant gratification
was every consumer's right, and cigarettes were legal, cheap, and available everywhere,
the public needed to be told on packages and in advertisements that they were also
addictive."24 Tobacco executives replied that smokers are aware of the dangers, but
disregard the warnings and choose to smoke anyway. Waxman's reply was simple: if the
industry thought the warning label useless, then it should be repealed, which is the.last
thing the industry wants because the warning label has become their chief shield against
liability lawsuits.

The tobacco control bill that eventually emerged from Waxman's subcommittee included
rotating warning labels on all packages and ads, disclosure of the quantity of carbon
monoxide, as well as tar and nicotine yields, and required that a list of all ingredients be
provided to Health and Human Services (HHS) officials. The tobacco manufacturers
declared the list of ingredients privileged information, even though all other products have
to disclose them. Congressman AI Gore (D-Tenn) brought the parties together for a

24
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settlement that finally passed in 1984. The bill marked the turning point of the industry's
long hold on the federal legislative system. Its lobbyists were seen by a growing number of
lawmakers as "duplicitous agents to the bitter end moguls and smoking was no longer an
25

issue to embarrass everyone in Congress. "

This did not mean that tobacco's influence in the legislative process was weakening.
Congressman Waxman introduced the Tobacco Control and Health Protection Act in
1990 and the Smoke Free Environment Act of 1994, which would have saved an
estimated 38,000 lives per year and more illnesses by banning smoking in all nonresidential
sites in the nation, but both bills were delayed in the legislative process. In 1993, after five
years of intensified research, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released its risk
assessment classifying ETS as Group A carcinogen, meaning that it causes at least one
death per 100,000.26 The report estimated that ETS caused 52,000 deaths each year. More
specifically, the EPA concluded that each year between 3,000 and 4,000 nonsmoking
adults die oflung cancer, and that 37-40,000 die from cardiovascular diseases as a result
of breathing the sidestream smoke from others' cigarettes. The EPA report was featured in
Congressional hearings, which resulted in the first successful national attempt at regulating
ETS: smoking was banned on domestic airline flights.
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According to Stanton A. Glantz, a professor of medicine at the University of California at

san Francisco, the death toll annually from passive smoking is closer to 53,000.27 This
makes ETS the third major U.S. killer, after active smoking and alcohol. 28 Most recently, a
new study by researchers at Harvard School of Public Health found that secondhand
smoke doubles the risk of heart disease. 29 The 10-year study, which traced 32,000 healthy
women who never smoked, found that regular exposure to secondhand smoke at home or
at work almost doubled the risk of heart disease. Their results indicate that up to 50,000
Americans die of heart attacks from secondhand smoke each year. This new finding raises
the estimated deaths from ETS much higher than the previously estimated 53,000.

Every governmental, scientific, or medical organization that has examined the issue has
concluded that ETS causes cancer in nonsmokers. The tobacco industry and people with
financial ties to the industry are the only ones that have publicly questioned this finding.
Remaining consistent, the industry discredited the studies and reports and attacked the
science just as they have throughout the history of tobacco regulation.(refer to the
following section) One tool used to counter the reports was a smokers' rights campaign.
The cigarette manufacturers used publications, such as Philip Morris Magazine. and
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newsletters such as Smokers' Advocate and Choice to recruit and "educate" smokers. In
1988, philip Morris Magazine claimed it had II million nonpaying readers. Smokers were
encouraged to become politically active by signing petitions, writing letters, making phone
calls, and showing up as a group at meetings where smoking restrictions were being
discussed.

There have not been many successes for the national or state anti-tobacco campaigns.
Public health and tobacco control groups have won only marginally notable legislative
victories in the past decade versus hundreds of defeats. However, in popular elections, the
record is the reverse. In 1993, 214local anti-tobacco ordinances passed and only 26 were
defeated. 30 It has become a commonly understood fact that the closer the issues are to the
voters themselves, the more tobacco loses; conversely, the more issues are handled out of
sight and in committees, the more tobacco wins. This is why preemption is such an
important issue. A preemption clause allows the tobacco industry to fight on one
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battlefront, preventing them from having to scatter their resources. In the I965 labeling
law, states were prohibited from regulating cigarette advertising by a preemption clause.
At first it was temporary, but it was made permanent in I971. This is an example of the
federal government imposing on state power. This can have dire consequences, as this
particular law suppressed potential product liability lawsuits. The most drastic action
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against the industry would be to repeal the preemption clauses, thus leaving the companies
at the mercy of SO state legislatures. It is much harder to comply with a patchwork of rules
and regulations, and it would become much more expensive to market cigarettes.

Congress is still unwilling to impose new regulations on tobacco. Legislation is currently
stalled on Capitol Hill that would strictly limit tobacco advertising and most tobacco
promotional techniques.

35

Chapter3
Tobacco's Influence:
The Lea:islatiye Branch

With the possible exception of the gun industry and its powerful National Rifle
Association, the tobacco industry is unrivaled among American industries in its ability to
stall effective public health policies while continuing to market its products that
indisputably cause much injury and death.31 Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence
against it, the industry manages to prevent effective governmental regulation through a
combination of skilled legal, political, and public relations strategies designed to confuse
the public by sustaining a controversy that should have been put to rest long ago . Insisting
that the controversy still exists enables the industry to avoid having to take responsibility
for the death and disease its products cause.

This tobacco industry "conspiracy" began on December 15, 1953, at the Plaza Hotel in
New York City' where a meeting of six tobacco company CEOs established the joint
1

industry group known as the Tobacco Industry Resource Committee (TIRC). On
January 4, 1954, the industry stated publicly in a full-page promotion carried in more than
400 newspapers around the country that it was forming the committee in response to
scientific reports to determine "truth"; however, in reality, it was formed with a public

1

Hilts. p.l .

,,

'

36

relations mission of preserving the status quo and maintaining the social acceptability of
smoking. By creating the TIRC, the industry established its unwillingness to deal
straightforwardly with society. Cigarette companies pledged in their "Frank Statement"
that they would spend money on smoking and health research, but most importantly, the
TIRC would serve the function of creating a controversy where none existed.
Representing tobacco companies and trade associations, the TIRC denied that smoking
causes cancer; they considered the scientific evidence thus far to be inconclusive. Its
mission was to prevent scientific and public health officials from effectively warning
people of the health hazard associated with tobacco. The TIRC later changed its name to
the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), but retained its mission to fund biased research
used in rebuttals to the mounting scientific health studies.

2

In 1958, the tobacco industry formed the Tobacco Institute, funding it in proportion to
each company's share of the market. The Tobacco Institute remains the industry's
I

influential Washington, D.C.-based trade association lobbying on behalf of the major
cigarette manufacturers in this country, as well as tobacco farmers, retailers, and factory
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Biased research methods included selecting grantees on the basis of their political or legal usefulness to the
industry, result-oriented research distorts the scientific process,(only favorable research was funded, the
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preventing disclosure of 'privileged' documents. (Using lawyers to decide which research is produced, so
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advertised function and operation of CTR.
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workers. The Tobacco Institute developed and implemented a public relations campaign
for tobacco. The industry used its economic and political power to curtail any regulatory
action and enlisted the help of political, cultural, and ideological allies ranging from antigovernment libertarians to labor unions and the ACLU. It became one of the most
effective public relations programs in history. In 1979, Senator Edward Kennedy referred
to the Tobacco Institute as, "Dollar for dollar, the most effective lobby on Capitol Hill."3

The cigarette companies worked together through this joint lobbying organization to
contain any adverse political effects of health studies. They succeeded in withholding
serious governmental restrictions by challenging the scientific case, confusing the public,
and reassuring their customers that smoking was not harmful. Internal documents from a
major tobacco company show that executives struggled over whether to disclose to the
Surgeon General in 1963 what they knew about the hazards of cigarettes. In more than
100 documents, letters, and cables from the internal discussions among tobacco
executives, they spoke of the hazards of cigarettes and stated plainly that nicotine is
addictive. The tobacco executives chose to keep their research results secret and to pursue
a legal and public relations strategy of admitting nothing. 4 It is difficult to ascertain how
much is actually spent on the institute's lobbying campaign. The industry has always been
determined to survive and prosper, no matter what the cost in dollars, disease, or death.
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The members of Congress representing tobacco states were in powerful positions in the
early 1960s. In the Senate, nearly one-fourth of the committees were chaired by men from
the six tobacco states: North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina,
and Virginia. A full one-third of the committees in the House were chaired by tobacco
state congressmen.s The chairmen from these states exerted extraordinary power on
matters that came before their committees, which enabled them to protect the tobacco
industry. On many bills, politicians do not have to answer for their votes at home because
they help defeat bills at the committee level, where their votes do not get reported at
home. 6 Tobacco does well at this level because Congressmen, especially committee
chairman, are susceptible to the effects of lobbying and campaign contributions, while they
remain insulated from voters because few of their crucial committee actions are reported.

Lobbyists for the tobacco companies seek to keep the status quo, keeping governmentai
regulation at a minimum. Because it takes fewer people to defeat legislation than it does to
pass it, the industry's job is easier than their opponents', where it takes many people
cooperating to get new legislation passed. For this purpose, a handful of legislators totally
dedicated to the tobacco issue, legislators who believe tobacco is their main job in political
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life, can be extremely effective. These devoted representatives have enabled the tobacco
industry to build a strong victory record. Tobacco interests have been successful in
confining their issues to committees chaired by their supporters and measures that appear
to be anti-tobacco, such as warning labels and advertising bans, were actually bills written
by tobacco lobbyists to protect the industry from more serious regulation.

As the medical case against smoking accumulated, the tobacco industry became more
devoted in its opposition. The industry scientists trivialized every new medical study and
report by challenging, distorting, or minimizing the unfolding evidence against it.
Ironically, the bad news about tobacco had the effect ofkeeping out competitors and
allowing the six established manufacturers to dominate the American cigarette market
totally, thus virtually ensuring their profitability. 7

While tobacco is grown in only 51 of the 435 congressional districts, what could be
known as the tobacco "coalition" directly includes everyone involved in the process of
growing to consuming tobacco, such as farmers, manufacturers, distributors, and
smokers.8 It also indirectly includes those who profit from the tobacco industry, such as
advertising agencies, media, and retailers. The crucial link in the industry's survival is the
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smokers, so the industry works very hard to lobby against any governmental activity that
might discourage smoking. The tobacco lobbying system includes the paid representatives
of the tobacco growers, marketing organizations, cigarette manufacturers, and elected
members of Congress representing tobacco constituents.

The 1979 Surgeon General's Report, Smoking and Health, provides insight into how the
industry reacted to the mounting scientific evidence against it. This report established a
complete consensus in the health and medical communities on the tobacco and health issue
by putting an end to the scientific controversy. However, to keep the one-sided
controversy open, the Tobacco Institute ran a series of advertisements after the release of
the report that stated, "Smoking was not a grave health issue, but merely one of several
equally acceptable social options, none ofwhich required intervention by government into
the lives of a sensible and civil people." 9 The Tobacco Institute has challenged every
single Surgeon General report since the first one in 1964 by producing advertisements and
distributing pamphlets criticizing the health community.

These marketing, political, and public relations strategies continued to protect the industry
throughout the '80s and early '90s. The tobacco industry used its significant economic
clout to try to sway public opinion by manipulating corporations, the media, and
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physicians. 10 The industry influenced editorial decisions and persuaded key organizations
and doctors to support their position by keeping the so-called controversy open. Movie
and TV deals included placing tobacco products in a positive light, and the media was held
to self-censorship concerning smoking and health in order to keep the large cigarette
advertisers happy. The tobacco industry paid writers to attack the health reports, while
disguising their connection to the industry. They ran deceitful advertisements, trying to
persuade smokers that there was no evidence that smoking causes death.

11

Recently, diversification oftobacco companies has increased, and the expanded companies
have changed their names, taking out the word "tobacco". One ofthe most strategic
aspects of diversification is that of geographic expansion, wherein tobacco companies gain
political and economic influence through acquisition of subsidiaries in non-tobacco
growing states and counties. Executives of these seemingly disinterested and unrelated
companies then take the lead in representing the business community in opposing
legislative restrictions on tobacco.

The strategy and tactics the industry used to defend itself are based on its need to be
perceived as a normal business, like any other business in capitalist America. However,
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unlike other businesses, the tobacco industry is the only industry that causes death when
its products are used as directed and intended. In 1987, Timothy Finnegan, a lawyer for

us Tobacco Co., warned corporate staff about the greatest danger for them: "The
industry was safe as long as juries don't see us as merchants of death." 12 Allowing
tobacco companies to be exempt from federal regulations and behave by a standard
different from other businesses is unjustifiable.

While there has been a dramatic proliferation of smoking control laws since the EPA
report of 1993, which range from simple (banning smoking on school buses) to
comprehensive (restricting smoking in most public places, including restaurants and all
workplaces), the policy debates that have erupted in local and state legislative arenas have
proved that the tobacco industry has switched its political strategy of opposing all
smoking control laws to pushing for laws that preempt local action and classifY smokers as
a protected class. Across the country, the tobacco industry is working to consolidate its
power in state capitals because state legislatures provide a forum more conducive to
working through political process by utilizing campaign contributions and well-placed
lobbyists to influence public policy. The tobacco industry would prefer to use state
political systems where citizens have less access to lawmakers, as opposed to localities
where public opinion generates policy change more rapidly.

12
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For the tobacco industry, the political battles over tobacco regulation are simply economic
wars. Financial resources seem to be no problem for the tobacco industry. Victor
Crawford, the Tobacco Institute lobbyist turned anti-smoking advocate, once admitted
that, "Our resources were enormous. Money was simply no object." 13 The industry uses
its money to influence legislators, to outlitigate the plaintiffs that bring lawsuits against
them, and to promote itself. Stephen Hilts uses a simile regarding the spending of industry
money: "The companies have master strategists who are paid fantastic salaries to put out
all media fires, like a professional killer. "14

The tobacco companies are consistently among the top non-partisan campaign
contributors at national and state levels. Cigarette P ACs contributed a reported 2. 5 million
dollars directly to members of Congress in the 91-92 term. 15 Common Cause calculated
that the soft money and PAC contributions during the 1995-6 election cycle totaled $9.9
million, nearly twice the industry's 1992 donations. 82% of 1996 members of Congress,
including both Democrats and Republicans received tobacco PAC money.16 Concerned
citizens, without access to disposable millions, are unable to form a strong enough
campaign to oust tobacco representatives, especially in tobacco states where legislators
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are simply representing their tobacco fanners' interests. 17

Because of its money and influence, the tobacco industry is regulated very little in relation
to the misfortune it causes. In I995, Vicki Kemper wrote for Common Cause, "Tobacco
remains largely unregulated 3I years, 50,000 studies, and more than I 0 million smokingrelated deaths after the I st Surgeon General's report certifying that smoking causes
disease, not only because of the fabled power of the tobacco lobby, but also because of the
other half of the equation, the lawmakers who take the money. "18 Lawmakers have to be
held accountable for their decisions both to accept tobacco money and to vote against
anti-tobacco legislation. Political winds may be changing in Washington and state capitals
as campaign finance reform emerges on the national agenda and the entire system of
money for votes is put under a microscope.

When the stability of their whole industry is at stake, it is worth all the money they have,
to try and save it. It took 26 years after the first Surgeon General's report on smoking and
health for Philip Morris to admit in its I990 annual report that cigarette smoking is a risk
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factor in the development of lung cancer and other diseases.
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The Smoke Ring

Besides tobacco's influence on the legislative branch, a main reason why governments
have taken so little action against the product that has been responsible for the deaths of
millions of its citizens is because governments are part of what Peter Taylor calls a
"Smoke Ring". The Smoke Ring is the ring of political and economic interests that has
protected the industry for the past few decades. Tobacco provides governments with a
large and reliable source of revenue through taxes and provides thousands ofjobs for the
American economy. These economic factors encourage governments to ignore the
activities of the tobacco industry. Politicians may invoke the "freedom of choice" defense
for their" inaction, but the real reason is more practical; they are on the side of the tobacco
industry due to the large campaign contributions. When governments were faced with
great environmental or occupational hazards to public health, such as asbestos, they took
political action once they had identified the cause.

The more government relies on tax revenue, the less likely public officials will be to
impose regulations discouraging sales. Currently, state governmental officials are dealing
with this dilemma in settlement talks over the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Lawsuit. If
the proposed agreement passes Congress, the companies will promise to pay the states a
portion of their profits over the next few decades. This will make the states dependent
upon cigarette sales maintaining current rates. A drastic decline in sales, while helping
public health, will hurt federal, state, and local governments financially. Peter Taylor
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describes this dilemma: "The battle to break the Smoke Ring is a battle between wealth
and health. The tobacco companies and governments want to keep people smoking
because of the wealth cigarettes create. The industry knows it will lose if the Smoke Ring

°

is broken, if both governments and consumers are weaned from cigarettes."2 Cigarettes,
and the tobacco industry's political donations, are too important for elected politicians to
give up; they need the money to win elections.

This has allowed the tobacco companies to become rich while challenging the world
medical community. Despite the scientific evidence against them, the companies are very
profitable and have a strong record of defending themselves against claims by injured
smokers. In addition, they have the political potency equal to or greater than that of any
other group in society.

Investing in tobacco stocks is yet another way in which governments are financially linked
to the tobacco industry. While some states are beginning to liquidate their tobacco
investments, tobacco stocks are among the most profitable on the market. A clear conflict
of interest rests upon the governments in this nation, which are supposed to be protecting
its citizens, but actually contribute to the tobacco problem by not strictly regulating it or
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discouraging tobacco use. Governments cannot be expected to regulate tobacco when
they rely on it for income.

Although the fact that tobacco use causes cancer has now been established beyond all
doubt, the government continues to go through the motions of dealing with the tobacco
problem. The Clinton administration is the first administration not completely influenced
by tobacco money. Even though the Smoke Ring is not as powerful as it has been in
previous administrations, it is far from disappearing. With the upcoming election in 2000,
it could very well return to the way it was. In 1996, Republican presidential candidate,
Bob Dole, stated in the last presidential debate that he did not believe nicotine is addictive.
He related smoking to drinking milk. To many politicians, the common knowledge that
nicotine is addictive can be easily forgotten with the acceptance of cash from the tobacco
industry. In politics, money can invalidate science and buy ignorance.
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Tobacco. Taxes. & the Economy

Tobacco is taxed by federal, state, and local governments. Historically, governments have
levied taxes to generate revenues. Increasingly, however, taxation of tobacco products is
being recognized as an effective strategy to discourage tobacco use and enhance public
health. The health benefits of raising cigarette taxes is not theoretical, they are proven.
Canada provides one of the clearest examples. Taxes were raised from 46 cents in 1980 to
an average of$3.27 in 1991. As a result, teen smoking in Canada has been reduced by
approximately 60% since 1980, and total cigarette consumption is falling faster than any
major industrialized nation in the world?1 In contrast, United States cigarette taxes have
not even kept pace with inflation. Today, federal excise taxes on tobacco products are 24
cents per pack, which is much lower than they were before the release of the 1964
Surgeon General's report. In 1965, the tax share on the price of a package of cigarettes
was just over 50%; in 1990 the percentage dropped to less than 25%. With the addition of
state cigarette taxes, the average total tax on a pack of cigarettes is 56 cents, or
approximately thirty percent of the retail price.

22

Increasing the cigarette excise tax would help achieve two goals in the financing of
healthcare: It would help balance the costs of tobacco use on society by paying for current
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healthcare costs directly attributed to tobacco use, and through ad campaigns help reduce
tobacco consumption, especially among teenagers, thus preventingfoture health costs.
Even though some would argue that raising the tax encourages the Smoke Ring, it could
be used to compensate governments for dollars spent on tobacco-related illnesses and for
smoking education campaigns aimed at smoking prevention. It would work toward
increasing public health by decreasing overall smoking rates. As smoking decreases, so

will the tax revenue and, eventually, the healthcare costs to society.

Increasing cigarette taxes undoubtedly saves lives. Substantial increase in tobacco taxes

will reduce cigarette smoking because the consumption of tobacco products is strongly
related to their affordability, especially among young people where smoking habits are not
firmly established yet. It is estimated that for every ten percent increase in the price of
cigarettes there will be a four percent reduction in tobacco consumption. 23 Higher excise
taxes on cigarettes would significantly reduce the number of youth who smoke and the
likelihood that children would begin smoking because youth tobacco consumption is
significantly more sensitive (three times as much) to price increases than adult
consumption. 24 By preventing the onset of smoking by young people, tremendous strides
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will be made in reducing the burden of addiction, disease, and death that tobacco use
imposes on the health of Americans.

The level of public support for higher tobacco taxes tends to increase when the revenues
from those taxes are earmarked for specific purposes, such as deficit reduction or health
care financing.25 Cigarette taxes provide an exceptional opportunity for government to
simultaneously save lives and raise substantial revenues for priorities such as healthcare. A
major increase in state and federal cigarette excise taxes will dramatically reduce tobacco
consumption, raise billions of dollars for federal and state treasuries, and save millions of
Americans from the turmoil tobacco use can cause.

Loss of tobacco-related jobs and the potential economic consequences of such jobs on the
economy is one argument used to oppose increases in tobacco taxes. However, the
economic impact of tobacco taxes is likely to be fairly small as a share of total economic
activity. Of the 2.3 million jobs claimed by the Tobacco Institute to be dependent on
tobacco, only 11% are directly involved in growing, warehousing, manufacturing, or
wholesaling tobacco products.

I

26

The remaining 2 million jobs are in sectors of the

economy that have no relation to tobacco, such as retailing and supplier jobs. Money not
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spent on tobacco would not disappear from the economy, but would be redirected to other
goods and services.

The anti-tax sentiment in Congress is currently the largest barrier to raising the cigarette
excise tax. This can be overcome by educating the lawmakers on the benefits of raising the
tax. Public opinion polls show that politicians should support the tax. It is one of the most
popular taxes in America, since the majority of citizens would not pay a cent for the tax.

One unintended consequence of raising the tax is that it would financially hurt lowerincomed individuals most because it would be a regressive tax. The majority of smokers is
less educated and has lower incomes, so, poor people would pay-a higher percentage of

j

their income for the tax than the rich and middle-class. This would place an unfair burden
on the lower class because taxes are easier for upper-incomed individuals to pay. On the
other hand, individuals with less income are also less likely to have personal health

l

insurance, so the state picks up the health tab for these smokers disproportionally. If these
taxes were specifically earmarked for the healthcare of smoking indigents, it would offset
the regressive value of the tax. This one effect of raising the tax would be outweighed by
the benefits to society of reducing youth, as well as overall, smoking rates. Thus, raising
the tax is an important step in promoting health through smoking prevention.

I
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Chapter 4

THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
If the regulation of tobacco was left to Congress alone, tobacco politics would have
continued as it was for years, possibly forever. Given tobacco's influence on the legislative
branch, the role of the President in tobacco regulation cannot be overlooked. Presidents
appoint cabinet members and heads of administrative agencies that have the potential to
advance or curtail the efforts oftobacco control groups. Presidents also have the
opportunity to encourage or discourage legislation or regulatory action or promote antitobacco messages. Throughout the history ofthe anti-smoking movement, much-needed
tobacco regulation was prevented due to the role of the President and his administration,
but the regulation that does exist resulted from actions of executive agencies like the
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communication Commission, and the Food and
Drug Administration.

In the 1960s, when one could say the controversy over tobacco regulation began,
President Johnson helped the tobacco interests by ignoring the issue because he needed
votes from the Southern representatives in order to implement his priority agenda, such as
his anti-poverty programs. The public health problem presented by tobacco was
downplayed by his administration, even as the initial Surgeon General report took on the
tobacco issue. This inactivity is ironic given that this administration implemented
healthcare programs for the poor.
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healthcare programs for the poor.

Nixon's administration was no more eager to involve itself in the tobacco issue than its
predecessors. By not preventing the passage of the broadcasting ban of cigarette ads in
Congress, this administration passively helped the public health interests. Two Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) anti-smoking advocates, Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld
and Daniel Horn, from the National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health, served under
Nixon. The National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health operated as an information
center alerting the public about the dangers of smoking. In 1971, Surgeon General
Steinfeld composed the largest ever report calling attention to important new
developments in smoking research. It was 488 pages of both old and new scientific
studies. 1

President Carter tried to avoid most of the tobacco issue because he needed to maintain
his political base, which coincided with tobacco country. However, Joseph Califano,
Carter's secretary of HEW proved to be the first cabinet member committed to the antismoking cause. He developed an anti-tobacco program that "was by far the most vigorous
of any ever proposed by aU. S. official of Cabinet rank." Declaring smoking a major cause

1
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of320,000 deaths a year in the U.S., he labeled tobacco as 11Public Enemy# 1. 11 2 Carter
gave absolutely no political support to Califano on the tobacco issue and eventually asked

him to resign before the 1980 election. In this administration, Carter's political ambitions
hurt the unstable anti-tobacco movement.

As with most everything else in the Reagan era, governmental regulation of tobacco took
the turn oflaissez-faire policies. There were many setbacks for the anti-tobacco campaign
under Reagan. Reagan, a former model for Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, was
openly pro-tobacco. His fundamentallaissez-faire attitude hurt consumers while

I

nourishing corporate America. He wrote a letter to Alexander Galloway, president of
RJR, stating his support of tobacco and reassuring him that they had nothing to fear from
his administration. He stated that his Cabinet would be much too busy to worry itself
about tobacco. 3 In this philosophy, unfettered capitalism and the financial well-being of a
business was more important than anything, including the health of consumers.

I

I

Dr. Everett Koop was the sole voice within the Reagan administration to speak out
forcefully on the smoking hazard. It could be said that he single-handedly reinvigorated
the anti-smoking movement. In his 1982 Surgeon General Report, he declared the
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consequences of smoking to be the most important public health issue of our time and
called cigarettes, "the chief, single avoidable cause of death in our society." 4

One step forward for the anti-tobacco cause came during the Bush administration when
the 1993 EPA report on ETS was published. President Bush appointed Surgeon General
Antonia Novello to succeed anti-smoking advocate C. Everett Koop. Her office produced
the 1994 Surgeon General Report, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People, which
explored the advertising and marketing of tobacco to the youth market, but for the most
part, she steered clear of the tobacco issue because she did not want "not to disrespect her
party." s Bush's HHS secretary did not propose any federal legislation regarding the
tobacco issue, either. President Bush did appoint David Kessler to head the FDA,
unknowing what consequences that action would have. The only other action that the
Bush administration had concerning tobacco was its United States Trade Representative's
promotion of it worldwide.

Most recently energizing the tobacco control movement, President Clinton became the
first President to be openly anti-smoking. Even though his actions were not exactly swift
and far sweeping, they were an improvement over any previous administration's public
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health efforts. This year, he ordered all federal workplaces to become smoke-free.
Although it sounds significant, it was mostly a symbolic gesture because most places
already were abiding by the indoor no-smoking code.

David Kessler, as FDA commissioner, became known as the outspoken anti-tobacco
advocate ofthe Clinton administration when in 1994, he wrote to the Coalition on
Smoking or Health declaring the FDA's intent to consider regulating the nicotine in
cigarettes as a drug. This was significant because tobacco was always exempt from FDA
regulation before. Kessler appeared before Waxman's subcommittee to address the issue
of nicotine in cigarettes. A few weeks later, on April14, 1994, the chief executive officers
of the seven tobacco companies testified before the same congressional committee that
nicotine and cigarettes are not addictive, no more harmful than coffee or Twinkies.

Internal industry documents from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company later revealed
that the executives lied under oath. 6 Despite its public position on the tobacco and health

I

I

issue, the documents proved that the industry was very aware of the causal link between
smoking and cancer. Stanton A Glantz, in "The Cigarette Papers," proves that tobacco
companies have known for decades that cigarettes are lethal and addictive and has done

6

The documents that revealed deception arrived at Professor Glantz's office at the University of
California- San Francisco. The Jownal of American Medical Association published the documents which
proved the industry's deception to the public.
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everything in its power to suppress and deny that knowledge. For 30 years, they chose to
protect their business interests over the public health by consistently de~ying any
knowledge and by hiding any adverse scientific evidence from the government and the
public. If the documents had been revealed earlier, the history of the tobacco control
movement might have been completely different.

With the support of the first outright anti-smoking President, the Food and Drug
Administration proposed regulations on cigarette sales and advertising in 1995. President
Clinton announced the regulations at a press conference. He framed this historic outreach
of federal jurisdiction as purely a public health initiative, a preventive program targeting
impressionable teenagers. Teenagers became the focus of public health officials because
they are starting to smoke in increasing numbers.

The proposed FDA regulations are by far the strictest regulations proposed on tobacco
ever. Included in the regulations are a federal ban on the sale of cigarettes to anyone under
18, preempting the diverse state bans, the requirement of photo identification for tobacco
purchases, the abolition of cigarette vending machines and mail order cigarettes, the
prohibition of cigarette billboards within I, 000 feet of schools, the banning of sponsorship
of sports and entertainment events, the banning of the sale or giveaway to youngsters of
promotional merchandise, and a limitation of some ads in print media to a black and white
text format. Most hurtful to the industry is the fact that if the FDA can prove it has
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jurisdiction over regulating nicotine and cigarettes, it most certainly will lead to even more
regulation. Now that the tobacco executives have been exposed to the public as deceptive
businessmen, public opinion is turning against the industry. More than four out of five
people agree with the proposed FDA policies. 7

Every major piece of health legislation since 1964 has had a specific exemption for
cigarettes. The 1995 FDA proposals were the first substantive rules ever proposed by the
government on tobacco in America. The tobacco industry challenged the constitutionality
of the proposals by taking the FDA to a federal court in North Carolina. The court ruled
that the FDA did have regulatory power over cigarettes due to the fact that nicotine is a
drug, and that cigarettes are therefore drug-delivery systems. However, the court further
declared that the FDA does not have the jurisdiction over the advertising and marketing of
cigarettes. Both sides of the ruling are currently on appeal and are expected to reach the
Supreme Court.

7
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ChapterS
Youth Smokin& Prevention

The purpose of the controversial FDA regulations is to reduce tobacco-related deaths by
pursuing a prevention strategy aimed at reducing youth smoking. This ultimate goal of
reducing the health toll associated with tobacco use is shared by all public health officials.
The most expedient way to reach this goal would be to implement a comprehensive youthcentered prevention program. Because 90% of all smokers start as teenagers, cigarette
smoking is labeled as a pediatric disease. 1 Considering that few adults initiate tobacco use,
a tobacco control policy focused on youth prevention should be one of the highest public
health priorities. The average teen smoker starts at age 13 and becomes a daily smoker-by
age 14 and 89% of persons who have ever tried a cigarette have done so by age 18.2. 3

The main components of such a public policy would have to include measures for
preventing youth smoking. By reducing youth access to tobacco products, increasing the
cost of tobacco, strengthening the social factors that discourage tobacco consumption,
(smoke-free norms and anti-tobacco advertising), and erasing the factors that encourage

1
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tobacco consumption, (free distribution and other marketing devices) the ultimate goal can
be achieved.

The anti-smoking advocates' focus on prevention proves to be a difficult task because
most young people who begin this destructive habit are motivated by pleasure or peer
pressure, and are not fully aware of the addiction they are developing or the damage they
are doing to their health. Thus, steps must be taken to improve youngsters' awareness of
the long-term dangers of tobacco use. This can be accomplished by implementing a youthcentered educational campaign through middle and high school curriculum activities and
advertising. It is harder for children to understand the long-term consequences of their
actions because tobacco does not kill immediately. Not being able to perform daily
functions, like walking or standing, due to emphysema and breathing problems, is
incomprehensible for most youngsters.

Teens begin smoking without comprehending the addictive nature of nicotine. Less than
5% of smoking high school seniors think they will be smoking in five years, yet follow-up
studies show 73% of those students are still smoking eight years later.4 The tobacco
industry argues that smoking adults willingly accept the dangers associated with tobacco
use. However, most adults start smoking in their early teens and become addicted before
they are mature enough to accept the health risks. The best chance to break the smoking

4
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cycle is to reach kids before they start smoking. Compounding the issue is the fact that
cigarettes are nicknamed as the "gateway drug"; using cigarettes is the number one
predictor of the use of other drugs. Youths between the ages of 12 and 18 who smoke are
eight times as likely to use illicit drugs and eleven times as likely to drink heavily as nonsmoking youths.5 Adults who started smoking as children are four times likelier to be

regular users of an illicit drug.6 Clearly, preventing cigarette smoking in early teens may
prevent later illegal drug use.

Reducing youth access to tobacco products must be an essential component of any
coherent strategy to prevent nicotine addiction in children and youths, and thereby

I

reducing the number of deaths from smoking-related diseases. Although selling tobacco to
minors is illegal in every state, these laws are seldom enforced. Each day, 3,000 young
people begin to smoke, (more than 1 million each year), and a third of them will eventually
die due to their use oftobacco. 7 The cigarette smoking rate among students are at their
highest in 16 years and has increased from 27.5% in 1991 to 34.8% in 1995. 8
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Although tobacco use is strictly a learned behavior, cigarette smoking can also be
described as a "contagious" behavior. The more time people spend around smokers,
especially in their formative years, the more likely they will become smokers themselves.
While contagious behavior may not be necessarily bad in itself, considering that cigarette
smoking is dangerous to health and addictive, this contagion effect contributes heavily to
the overall smoking problem. Experimenting with tobacco is attractive to children because
of its association with adult behavior. Repeated messages reinforcing the positive
attributes of tobacco use give youths the impression that tobacco use is pervasive,
normative in many social contexts, and socially acceptable. They are encouraged to believe
that tobacco consumption is a social norm among attractive, vital, successful people who
seek to express their individuality, who enjoy life, and who are socially secure. The
tobacco industry states that they do not market to children and that they do not encourage
kids to smoke. Considering that many adult smokers die each year, the industry relies on
the many new teenage "replacement" smokers to compensate for their consumer loss
otherwise, they would eventually go out of business. Even though advertising does not
cause children to smoke, it does undermine the efforts to create a tobacco-free norm by
emphasizing that smoking is acceptable, even desirable, behavior. Research suggests that
adolescents are more responsive than adults to advertisements because they are looking
for self-identity. 9
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Children often perceive tobacco use to be much more prevalent than it really is. They
commonly overestimate the percentages of their peers and adults who use tobacco. This
may be because pro-tobacco messages are everywhere. These pro-tobacco messages send
a false impression about tobacco. They do not tell of addiction, disease, and death
associated with tobacco use. The best way to counter these pro-tobacco messages is to
have even more anti-tobacco messages in society. This was demonstrated in the Seventies
when the anti-smoking ads required by the Fairness Doctrine caused a reduction in the
teen smoking rate. Study findings "suggest that a nationwide, well-funded, anti-smoking
campaign could effectively counter the effects of cigarette advertising in its currently
permitted media forms." 10 This leads one to believe that counter-advertising is effective
and that the best strategy is not necessarily strict regulation of cigarette advertising, which
is the most controversial of the proposed FDA regulations.

Few groups actually focus on tobacco prevention in youths; among the few are: Stop
Teenage Addiction to Tobacco (STAT) and Students Coalition Against Tobacco (SCAT),
which emphasize peer education. Eventually, all tobacco control policies, either directly or
indirectly, affect youths. The efforts of community organizations, coalitions, and advocacy
groups have been successful in improving public awareness of the problems of tobacco
and the public has become more supportive of tobacco control efforts. However, strong
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grassroots support for tobacco control policies at the local level is too often neutralized
through powerful lobbying by the tobacco industry at the state level, resulting in weak
state legislation that preempts more restrictive local measures.

Most Americans agree with the consensus that children should not smoke. Even the
tobacco companies agree that smoking is an adult behavior. Where they differ is how to
implement this prevention policy. Some say kids should not be punished for smoking or
possessing tobacco~ instead, they blame teen smoking on the tobacco industry' s
advertising and marketing techniques. Others feel that teen smoking prevention begins at
home, or at school. These barriers have to be broken before the successful implementation
of a youth-centered prevention policy.
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Chapter 6
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment

The First Amendment to the Constitution includes protection for the freedom of speech
and expression. Nevertheless, advertising has never been afforded the rights granted other
fonns of speech. Many, including most anti-tobacco advocates, regard commercial speech
as different from other fonns of speech. More specifically, tobacco foes regard tobacco
advertising as false, deceptive, and misleading advertising which is illegal. While the
Supreme Court decided that protection of speech has limits when the speech involves
substantial public interest, like protecting the health of children, they have not yet ruled,
on the constitutional validity of the anti-tobacco position.

1

The Court has set a number of precedents regarding commercial speech. Under Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, in the 1986 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the tobacco industry's commercial speech rights
may be suspended by government because government also has the power to banish the
industry itself 2 The Court made it clear that commercial speech enjoys a kind of secondclass protection. The Justices conclude that the framers of the Constitution originally
intended free speech rights to protect political and social speech, not commercial speech

1

Tobacco is not the only case in which commercial speech protection has limits. Restrictions are applied
for prescription drugs, as well as stocks and bonds in the interest of conswner protection.
2
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used to sell products. Some would contend that this is not the case. Craig Smith, president
of Freedom of Expression Foundation, argues that the framers, as men of commerce,
included commercial speech as essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

3

More recently, in the 1996 Liquormart 44 decision, the Court protected commercial
speech declaring it unconstitutional for government to ban truthful advertising. For closer
understanding of what is considered constitutional, one must apply the four-part test of
the 1980 Central Hudson Gas decision. The first and most important criterion is that the
speech must "concern lawful activity" and "not be misleading." The rest of the criteria
determine the degree of regulation that is acceptable: whether the governmental interest is
substantial, whether it directly advances the governmental interest, and whether it is more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 4 These criteria, especially the last, are
very subjective. What is considered "more extensive than necessary" varies greatly among
those who concern themselves with the issue.

Most anti-smoking advocates believe that tobacco advertising targets young people and
influences their perception of smoking, thus provoking their desire to try tobacco. By
using cartoon characters, the industry brings new young smokers into the tobacco market,
3

Craig Smith. "First Amendment Rights of Corrunercial Speakers." ( Center for First Amendment Studies,
California State University, 1997): Jonathan Emord. "Continued Distinctions: The Doctrine of Corrunercial
Speech in First Amendment Jurisprudence." Policy Analysis. (September 23, 1991).
4
116 S.Ct. 1495. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission. 1980.

68

replacing those that have died or quit. Because this advertising is aimed at children, it is
number one on the anti·smoking advocates' desired list of restrictions on the industry. The
1994 Surgeon General's report, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People, focused
on the impact tobacco advertising and promotional activities have on youth tobacco
consumption. The report indicates that young people are an important market for the
tobacco industry.

Tobacco sponsorship of sports represents one of the tobacco industry's most ironic
promotion techniques. Tobacco use is anti·fitness, endurance, and performance, but is
used to promote these qualities. Since disease and death from tobacco use are long· term
processes, and cannot be seen as an immediate result of smoking, children are more apt to
believe the false images in ads that portray actors or characters as healthfUl and athletic.

While ads may not cause minors to smoke, per se, they do contribute to the general
perceptions of its' acceptability and counter the public health messages that tobacco is
dangerous. However, the extent the role tobacco advertising plays in convincing new
smokers to start smoking is difficult to assess. One cannot study the effect of advertising
while holding all other variables constant. Reality suggests that its role is less direct. It
simply sets the stage for the social acceptability of smoking.

Tobacco companies, however, insist that they advertise only to the current market of
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smokers, trying to get them to switch brands. They state that cigarette promotion is not
designed to increase overall use of cigarettes~ it is instead intended only to affect market
shares. Because of the overall decline in adult consumption, the tobacco companies are
competing for shares of a shrinking domestic market by increasing expenditures for
advertising and promotion. Collectively, the tobacco industry spends more than $4.83
billion each year--$13.2 million per day-- to advertise and promote tobacco products. 5
This results in massive exposure to a wide array of pro-tobacco messages every day.

Besides encouraging smoking acceptability, tobacco advertising discourages effective
dissemination of anti-tobacco messages. Since the broadcast ban of cigarette advertising,
magazine advertising revenue from the tobacco industry increased by $5.5 million per
magazine per year.6 This major spending on print advertising directly inhibits printing of
articles criticizing tobacco. Numerous studies prove that magazines that receive sizable
revenues for advertising tobacco are less likely to run articles that discuss the negative
aspects of tobacco use than magazines not dependent on tobacco industry revenue.
Investigations have demonstrated that magazines that accept cigarette advertising--$264.4
million worth in 1991-- show consistent patterns of self-censorship, as compared with
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magazines that do not accept it. 7 Given the diversity of tobacco companies into more
legitimate businesses, such as General Foods, this censorship includes instances where
tobacco is not necessarily the product being advertised. This self-censorship gives the
public a distorted view of the dangers of smoking; they receive the positive promotional
messages about tobacco, but no fact-based information.

The discussions on the First Amendment rights of the tobacco industry are far from final.
A major portion of the 1995 proposed FDA regulations, now in the appeals process,
restricts the promotion and advertising of tobacco. Many, including the ACLU, believe it
is not constitutional to ban slogans, models, scenes, or colors. Banning or restricting
tobacco advertising raises philosophical and pragmatic issues. Questions concerning
freedom of speech and the rights of a legal industry top the list, but practical concerns
involving the effect of the removal of tobacco money from the advertising and magazine
industry need to be addressed while the debate of banning tobacco advertising continues.
It should be remembered that the broadcast ban of tobacco advertising actually raised

profits for the industry, and a full advertising ban could be expected to do the same, (if
consumption did not immediately fall, which is highly unlikely due to the fact that most
smokers smoke because they physically have to, not because they want to).

7

K.E.Wamer, L.M. Goldenhar, and G. C. McLaughlin. "Cigarette Advertising and Magazine Coverage of the
Hazards of Smoking: A Statistical Analysis." New England Journal of Medicine. (1992). vol. 326. p.305-309.
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The ACLU defends tobacco interests in terms of the First Amendment. "The overarching
guiding principle driving the ACLU is that government cannot carve out exceptions from
the Amendment's protection of unwanted or hated speech," Ira Glasser says. "In a fair
contest between medical facts and the tobacco industry's self-serving propaganda, the facts
will win. That is the premise of the First Amendment. "8 The only problem with this
explanation is that it is not a fair contest. Everyday, the industry spends the equivalent of
the entire annual federal budget on anti-tobacco education, prevention, and research.

9

One solution is counter advertising, but that would only be effective with roughly equal
amounts of money. Raising the anti-smoking education budget to the industry's level is
impossible. While placing spending limits on advertisers also may inhibit free speech, once
the alternatives are weighed, it proves to be a better option than banning advertising
altogether.

Although anti-smoking advocates have their heart in the right place, an American citizen's
right to free speech does not stop just because tobacco is a deadly product. Weighing the
constitutional issues is a difficult task. Is there a hierarchy of speech, with some protected
more than others? Is there any value at all in speech that promotes racism, sexism, or in
the case of tobacco, disease and death? If such a hierarchy exists, then certainly

8
9

American Cancer Society. "Allies: The ACLU and Tobacco."
Visitor from the Past. Raven Radio Theater of the Air!, Nevada City, California.
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pornography would not receive much First Amendment protection.

Americans are taught to let people speak and be heard, and then form an opinion of their
own. In the battleground of ideas, the facts should win out over deception when they are
given a fair chance. Striving for an educated constituency is more important than
censoring tobacco advertising. Using youth-centered smoking prevention strategies would
better prepare our future adults for dealing with life choices than simply prohibiting
tobacco advertising. Teaching them how to recognize the deception would prevent the
dissolution of one of our most valuable freedoms.
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Chapter?
The Role of the .Judicial Branch

The legal system is a less than perfect arena for dealing with the important issue of
smoking and health; instead of determining what is ethical or moral, it can only determine
only what is legal or illegal. Utilizing the legal system can be very expensive. There are
J,IIllny delays, and the arbitrariness and the skill oflawyers often count for more than the
righteousness of their cause.

The first group oflawsuits filed against the tobacco companies came in the mid-1950s
after hazards of tobacco first became explicit. In this first wave oflawsuits, smokers
sought recovery from the tobacco industry for smoking-related illnesses after the early
evidence that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer surfaced. Lasted approximately ten
years, this group oflawsuits were argued under 'breach of implied and express warranty',
deceit, and negligence theories. By the early 1970s, the evidence of the health dangers of
smoking had accumulated to the point of causing serious legal problems for the tobacco
industry. The industry was being attacked on many fronts as it faced increasing
government efforts to regulate it.

The second wave oflawsuits came in the mid-80s, when the industry had to contend with
a new wave of product liability lawsuits. These lawsuits were brought forth under strict
liability claims. To be successful, the plaintiffs had to prove the product was
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'unreasonably' dangerous. If a plaintiff could prove that the tobacco industry was
responsible for the death of a smoker by winning one lawsuit, the eventual liability of the
industry might bankrupt it. Although very serious, this threat of product liability suits was
weakened by the cigarette labeling act because it gave the industry the defense of the
assumption of risk. The health warning label acted like a protective shield for the defense
of the lawsuits. If consumers are made aware of the dangers by the warning label, and they
still use the product, then they have no right to sue because by making an informed
decision to smoke, they assume the risks associated with it. This argument is founded on
the belief that the warning label adequately informs potential smokers of the real health
dangers of tobacco use. Some may disagree with this assumption because the label is very
broad and has relatively weak language; nonetheless, product liability suits have been
important in encouraging other industries to act responsibly, for example, forcing
automobile makers to make safer cars, and drug makers to test products carefully. But
after more than hundreds oflawsuits until last year, the tobacco industry has never paid a
penny to compensate a smoker.

These first and second waves of lawsuits involved single clients and relatively small
amounts of money. Many of these first cases were dropped due to the depleted resources
of the plaintiff. Misconduct by either side is cause for a mistrial. Most plaintiffs cannot
afford a second trial, so in a mistrial tobacco wins. In one instance, the tobacco lawyers
made depositions last for 292 days. The legal system is often not able to deal fairly with
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clients that have such varying amount of resources. Tobacco companies are so rich and
powerful that they can take advantage of all the rules. General Patton, R.J. Reynolds'
attorney has admitted to the strategy of bankrupting the plaintiff.

1

This is blatant denial of

substantive due process by taking advantage of a lack of sufficient money to fund a legal
attack on the tobacco companies.

The 1990s brought the third wave of lawsuits and this time nicotine addiction was a large
part of the trials. These lawsuits were a result of the 1988 Surgeon General's report that
officially declared nicotine as addictive. Tobacco companies vehemently denied this
scientific finding, but later, internal industry documents revealed that the addictive nature
of nicotine was recognized by the industry in the early 1960s. This third wave oflawsuits
also includes secondhand, or passive smoking, suits and state governments trying to
recover billions of dollars spent on medical treatment for smokers' illnesses. In these cases,
individual choice becomes a secondary issue, while it was a primary issue in the previous
waves. The state complaints are based on the notion that the tobacco industry caused a
health crisis and should now be responsible for paying for it, but none of these state cases
have gone to trial because the industry has settled them out of court, making certain
voluntary concessions in order to dismantle any potential future or pending lawsuits.

I

Hilts. p.J97.
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The tobacco industry has been braced for this litigation since the early 1950s, and until last
year they pursued a successful strategy of no settlements. There have not been any final
court awards against the industry. This is a remarkable record, one that is probably
unequaled in American law. Although they have precedent on their side, the companies are
extremely vulnerable because they cannot afford to lose even one single case. Their recent
willingness to settle the state lawsuits can be understood when it is realized that any
negotiations typically favor the industry. A proposed "global" settlement, stalled for the
time being in Congress, reaches an agreement for payment to the states and includes
immunity against future lawsuits. While waiting for Congressional approval, the industry
has had to settle individual state lawsuits.

The smallest of the tobacco companies, Liggett & Myers, was the first company to break
the solid front oftobacco. This year, Liggett settled with all of the 22 states that had
pending lawsuits. In the most significant part of the settlement, the company officials
agreed to produce information and aid in pursuing the other tobacco companies in court.
For the first time a tobacco company admitted that nicotine is addictive. But, even this
hopeful tum for the anti-tobacco campaign was not motivated by public health concerns;
instead Bennett LeBow, Chairman and CEO of Liggett Group, was trying to rescue his
small company from a takeover by RJR.

Tobacco industry lawyers are working persistently to defend themselves against both
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potential and pending lawsuits. Judges and juries are now presented with a landslide of
important cases of different kinds, and they now have some reasonable access to the facts
of scientific studies. Ultimately, the judicial branch of government will decide whether the
tobacco companies are within the bounds of what is acceptable or not and whether certain
governmental regulation of tobacco is justified and constitutional.
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Conclusion

Cigarette smoking is the number one preventable cause of death in the United States. With
someone in the world dying from a tobacco-related illness every thirteen seconds, the antitobacco movement cannot be pushed aside as liberal health fanatics imposing restrictions
on individual rights. The movement is a serious campaign that is working to save lives and
protect nonsmokers, with an emphasis on preventing tobacco's appeal to children.

While saving lives is a universal end, the proper means to achieve that end is a subject of
debate. The anti-tobacco forces have paid a heavy price for their inability to agree on
issues and for not appearing as a united front. On the other hand, the tobacco industry's
main asset was its ability to maintain successfully a solid united front from the early Sixties
until this year. Before the emergence of the anti-smoking movement, all legislation and
regulatory action regarding tobacco took place on the national level. In contrast, the first
few victories of the anti-tobacco cause were results of grassroots efforts. Recent political
actions have given a burst to the tobacco control movement, but, in many areas, it still has
not reached its ultimate potential by combining forces and coordinating the tobacco
control movement federally, statewide, and locally. Most realize the importance of
coordinating actions, but the practical matter of actually doing it on a daily basis despite
personality differences or other obstacles is more difficult than it sounds.

The social unacceptability of tobacco use seems to be emerging as tobacco use has
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emerged as the number one health problem of our time. The high level of compliance with
public smoking restrictions reflects a widespread acceptance of the norm favoring smokefree enviromnents and their legitimacy. However, every twenty minutes, the tobacco
industry spends more money to promote itself than the U.S. spends annually to prevent its
use. 1 This emphasizes the need for an increase in pro-health, anti-tobacco messages.
States greatly diversifY in the amount of effort and money aimed at targeting young
audiences with anti-tobacco advertisements or education campaigns. Being healthy and
raising healthy children is much easier when healthy behavior is stressed as important and
the pro-tobacco signals are countered with effective anti-tobacco messages.

Some well-intentioned activists are unable to agree on the focus of the solution to the
tobacco problem. Some advocates insist that anti-tobacco efforts are a waste of time and
money because those efforts would best help society by focusing on alcohol or illegal drug
use, instead of tobacco. Typically, illegal drug or alcohol use is thought of as a more
severe societal problem than tobacco use, and many advocates do not recognize tobacco
use as the important problem that it is.

Tobacco use prevention needs to be considered as an important part of the solution for
these advocates. The most obvious reason is the gateway drug factor. Preventing tobacco1

Joe B. Tye. "Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco." Tobacco and Yonth Re.porter. (Springfield, MA,

Autumn 1990) p.3.
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use among young people will eventually help prevent them from abusing illegal drugs or
alcohol, as tobacco use is the number one predictor of such behavior. Discouraging teen
tobacco use helps the "anti-illegal drug or alcohol" cause, and does not compete with it.
Another strong, but often overlooked, reason in support of tobacco control is that tobacco
use kills more people each year than does illegal drug use; not only more than illegal drug
and alcohol use, but more than car accidents, homicides, suicides, AIDS, and fires
COMBINED! 2 Given the enormity of the problem, one would think that more would be
done to prevent such disaster. Because one in five deaths in the US is attributable to
tobacco use, reducing smoking would arguably have more impact on the nation's health
than any other public health initiative. The urgency of this issue is great. This nation has a
compelling interest in reducing the health burden of tobacco use.

I
I

In conclusion, society, as a whole, has an interest in discouraging tobacco use and

supporting the efforts of people who are trying to stop using tobacco because the
aggregate effects of tobacco-related health consequences affect everyone. Govermnent, as
appointed leaders of society, should, if not lead, then at least encourage the efforts of the
medical and health communities, instead of putting up political roadblocks. Even though
many anti-tobacco efforts can and do successfully proceed without govermnental
assistance, such as the educational promotion of health in schools and local communities
2

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1 988,1987, 1990), National Center for Health
Statistics (1988), National Safety Council(l989).
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by non-profit health conscience organizations, some of the most important anti-tobacco
goals can only be accomplished with governmental aid, and through implementing public

I
I

health policies. Such policies include banning smoking in public places, such as
restaurants, repealing preemption clauses in state clean indoor air laws thus allowing
further local smoking restrictions, and cracking down on illegal youth access to tobacco
products and marketing to young people.

There is public support for tobacco control measures. Whereas the majority of Americans

I
I

once smoked, now fewer than three out of ten American adults smoke, and this ratio is
continuing to decline. Because the nonsmoking majority has little sympathy for the 2530% of their fellow citizens who continue to smoke, the anti-tobacco movement is
succeeding on the local level. 3 States are beginning to ban or rigidly confine smoking
almost everywhere people congregate. By 1995, according to Common Cause magazine,
more than 600 local jurisdictions joined in a patchwork of anti-smoking restrictions across
America. With the latest developments in the tobacco lawsuits, and the aggressive FDA

I
I

regulations on the horizon, greater federal oversight of tobacco and nicotine seems
inevitable.'

3
4

Kluger. p.678.

Lawyers will continue to bring lawsuits agomst the tobacco industry until legislation is passed
preventing future lawsuits. This exploms the industry's willingness to reach the settlement currently stslled
on Capitol Hill. If history repeats itself, this new legislation will not necessarily decrease tobacco use or
benefit poblic health. Usually, when tobacco supports legislation, the regulations prove to be watered down
or eventually backfire on tobacco control advocates. Soon Americaus will know if it is a new era for antitobacco or the same old story.
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Appendix A
International Focus

According to the World Health Organization, as 1.1 billion people in the world smoke and
3 million of them die each year due to their use of tobacco, tobacco use is quickly
1

replacing infectious disease and malnutrition as the leading cause of death worldwide.

Tobacco use is a worldwide epidemic, and every nation is confronted by a challenge
similar to the one faced in the U.S. During the 1990s, in developed countries, tobacco will
cause approximately 30% of all deaths among persons 35-69 years of age, making it the
largest single cause of premature death in the developed world.

2

Mostly responsible for this, the U.S. tobacco industry is second only to China in tobacco
production and it exports more than three times as many cigarettes as does any other
country in the world. 3 Aggressive marketing by all international tobacco companies will
require an aggressive response by public health officials in the developing world and in
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Barbara Crossette. "Noncommunicable Diseases Seen AB Growing Heallh Problem." New York Times,
1
(September
16, 1996) p.A7: Dong Levy. "Tobacco Looms as Top Dealh Factor," USA Today, (September 16,
1996)p.
D6. V. Chandler. Banishing Tobacco. Worldwatch Paper 68. (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch
William
2

Institute,
U.S.1986)p.l274-5.
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. "World Tobacco Situation." (Washington,
3

D.C., 1992) (Doc.FT-8-92)
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Missing from the proposed 'global' tobacco settlement that has reached the legislative
branch of the U.S. federal government are the consequences of selling tobacco in foreign
markets. While adult tobacco use rates are relatively flat or declining in the U.S., they are
rising elsewhere, especially in developing countries. Approximately 85% of the annual
three million tobacco-related deaths occur outside of the United States. 4 It is unethical to
pursue tobacco control measures domestically, fully knowing that as American tobacco
consumption dwindles, efforts are intensifying in soliciting new tobacco markets abroad. It
is difficult to ignore the fact that we are solving our public health problem by pushing it off
onto other countries. As the United States finds solutions to the public health problem
tobacco poses, efforts need to be made at helping foreign nations deal with the tobacco
health crisis. Using any successful strategies developed and implemented in this nation,
Americans should demand that tobacco products are responsibly marketed abroad. Public
health messages about the dangers of tobacco use, as well as ETS, should be widely
available. Even though some Americans greatly benefit financially from exported tobacco,
it is not ethical to take advantage ofless-advantaged people. In the name of free
enterprise, the United States will be responsible for many smoking-related deaths in other
nations. There is plenty of money to be made, but is benefiting from someone's death

4

World Health Organization. "A Consultation on Statistical Aspects of Tobacco-Related Mortality."
(Geneva, 1989).
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clean money? Are Americans that greedy? While it may be in the best interest ofthe
United States to have all smokers worldwide smoke American brands, causing harm to
another human being for one's own financial benefit is unconscionable.
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AppendixB
More can and should be done about ETS
While clean indoor air laws are now the norm, much more can and should be done to
protect nonsmokers, including children, from ETS.

Restricting smoking outside may be a difficult position to justify, but some cities,
states or counties have banned smoking on their properties. The town board of
Carmel, a Californian community of 30,000 voted in favor of smoke-free beaches.
Violators will be fmed $50 for smoking or discarding cigarette butts in the sand or
in plant boxes bordering the beach. Each year, the Center for Marine Conservation
finds that cigarette paraphernalia is the greatest source of beach litter. While it is
not exactly a public health issue, littering cigarette butts is a great environmental
problem, not to mention an eyesore to those who value nature and try to keep the
environment safe.

The preemption clause should be removed from the state clean indoor air laws,
allowing local communities to increase governmental regulation of tobacco use. In
most states, the clean indoor air laws do not include restaurants or bars, where
workers are involuntarily exposed to ETS. Scientific studies examining the
economic impact of smoke-free restaurant legislation from New York, California,
Colorado and Texas show that enactment of smoke-free restaurant ordinances has
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not caused revenue loss and in fact has increased business by a minimum increase
of 5% of meal receipts. 1 This is explained by the majority, nonsmokers, will
patronize businesses more, if smoking is not allowed.

While most large corporations already have smoking policies in place, there is
much room for improvement. Walt Disney World, which caters to families, should
have a no-smoking policy to promote public health and demonstrate to children that
smoking is an unacceptable behavior.

S.A. Glantz et al. "The Effect of Ordinances Requiring Smoke-Free Restaurants on Restaurant Sales."
American Journal ofPublicHealth. (July 1994): MMWR, "Smoke-Free Ordinances," vol.44, 1995.

1

87

AppendixC
List of Surgeon General Reports: 1964-1994
1964

Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Commitee to the Surgeon General

of the Public Health Service
1967

The Health Consequences of Smoking : A Public Health Service Review

1968 The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1968 Supplement to the 1967 Public
Health Service Review
1969

The Health Consequences of Smoking: 1969 Supplement to the 1967 Public

Health Service Review
1971

The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General

1972

The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon General

1973 The Health Consequences of Smoking, 1973
1974

The Health Consequences of Smoking, 1974

1975

The Health Consequences ofSmoking,1975

197 6 The Health Consequences of Smoking: Selected chapters from 1971 through
197 5 reports
1978

The Health Consequences ofSmoking,1977-1978.

1979

Smoking and Health: A report of the Surgeon General

1980

The Health Consequences of Smoking for Women: A Report of the Surgeon

General
1981

The Health Consequences of Smoking- The Changing Cigarette:A report of the

Surgeon General
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1982

The Health Consequences of Smoking- Cancer: A Report of the Surgeon General.

1983

The Health Consequences of Smoking- Cardiovascular Disease: A Report of the

Surgeon General.
1984

The Health Consequences of Smoking- Chronic Obstruction Lung Disease: A

Report of the Surgeon General.
1985

The Health Consequences of Smoking- Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the

Workplace: A Report of the Surgeon General.
1986

The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking: A Report of the Surgeon

General
1988

The Health Consequences of Smoking- Nicotine Addiction: A Report of the

Surgeon General
1989

Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking- 25 Years of Progress: A Repoort

of the Surgeon General
1990

The Health Benefits of Smoking Cessation: A Report of the Surgeon General

1992

Smoking in the Americas: A Report of the Surgeon General

1994 Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General
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